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Abstract: Permissionless blockchain systems inspired by Bitcoin and related crypto-ecosystems 
are frequently promoted as the enablers of an open, distributed, and decentralized ideal. They 
are hailed as a solution that can “democratize” the world by creating a technological imperative 
favoring open, distributed, and decentralized systems, platforms, and markets. We argue that 
such claims and expectations, while they may be fulfilled under certain circumstances, are 
generally exaggerated and often misguided. They illustrate a penchant to associate open access 
with decentralized control in distributed architectures, an association that while possible is far 
from guaranteed. When enterprise, social and economic activities are “put on the blockchain” in 
order to avoid centralized control, permissioned governance may offer a more decentralized and 
more predictable outcome than open permissionless governance offers in practice. 
 




Permissionless blockchain systems inspired by Bitcoin and related crypto-ecosystems are 
frequently promoted as the enablers of an open, distributed, and decentralized ideal. They are 
hailed as a solution that can “democratize” the economy by creating a technological imperative 
favoring open, distributed, and decentralized systems, platforms, and markets. 
 
We argue that such claims and expectations, while they may be fulfilled under certain 
circumstances, are frequently exaggerated or even misguided. They illustrate a tendency to 
equate open access with decentralized control in distributed architectures, an association that 
while possible is far from guaranteed. When enterprise, social and economic activities are “put 
on the blockchain” in order to avoid centralized control, the permissioned governance may offer a 
more decentralized and more predictable outcome than open permissionless governance offers 
in practice. 
 
Access and Control in Distributed Systems 
 
Information systems can be characterized on three key dimensions: architecture, which can be 
concentrated or distributed (Tanenbaum and Van Steen 2007), access, which can be 
permissionless or permissioned (Abadi et al. 1993), and control (i.e., the locus of decision 
rights), which can be centralized or decentralized (King 1983). These dimensions are not binary, 
and the associated labels should be thought as endpoints of a continuum. 
 
Permissionless systems do not restrict who has access, and thus are also referred to as open-
access.1 For instance, in principle anyone can post source code on GitHub, edit a Wikipedia 
article, or validate bitcoin transactions. Permissioned systems only grant access to qualified 
users. The distinction for control focuses on who gets to make decisions. Centralization implies 
that decisions are made by a single person or a small group; decentralization means that 
decision rights are widely distributed (King 1983). 
 
It has long been argued that concentrated architectures favor permissioned access and 
centralized control because these types of access and control reinforce the benefits of these 
architectures (King 1983); see for instance early arguments about Grosch’s law for computer 
hardware (Grosch 1953), or the administration of early databases. However, as technology 
evolved to enable or even favor distributed system architectures, open access and decentralized 
control emerged as feasible alternatives.  
 
In this article we examine the issues of open vs. permissioned access and centralized vs. 
decentralized control in distributed systems, focusing on blockchain implementations. We argue 
that while distributed architectures may enable open access and decentralized control, they do 
not preordain these outcomes. Furthermore, while open access and decentralization are 
frequently thought as complementary (Liu et al. 2019), experience from real-world applications 
suggests that the opposite can also be true: open access may result in essentially centralized 





1 We will often use the term open-access for permissionless systems to avoid any confusion from 
repeated use of the terms permissionless and permissioned. 
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How Permissioned Systems Can Be More Decentralized 
 
While this possibility may seem counter-intuitive at first, it can be understood as a consequence 
of the need to provide appropriate incentives to system participants, especially the ones that 
operate the technology after its implementation. The economic theory of Incomplete Contracts 
(Hart and Moore 1990, Hart 2016) shows that when an agent’s actions affect the value of an 
asset, such as an information system, but these actions cannot be contractually specified (e.g., 
because the necessary behaviors cannot be adequately verified), the agent should be given 
corresponding control or ownership to maximize agent incentives. Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and 
Madnick (1995) apply this argument to derive design principles for databases; for instance, when 
maintenance of data quality is important, any independent local data partitions should be locally 
controlled.  
 
These considerations apply to systems beyond databases, however. In the blockchain context 
certain system participants can be indispensable in the sense that the system’s operation and 
value generation will depend on actions that cannot be contractually specified. In such cases, the 
need to incentivize these participants will likely lead to outcomes where they effectively control 
the parts of the system over which they are indispensable. Depending on the particular situation, 
this can lead towards either centralized or decentralized control. For instance, in an open access 
and fully distributed environment it may be infeasible to incentivize participants to adequately 
provide functions like quality control or coordination of system development and evolution. To 
address this problem, centralized solutions emerge de facto, such as the hierarchy of the small 
number of developers controlling open source projects (Crowston and Howison 2005), or the 
hierarchy of editors in Wikipedia (Ortega et al. 2008). This is because expertise, reputation, time, 
or money can all be required to take advantage of open access and decentralized control. The 
higher these costs are, the fewer the people who want to participate, which contributes to this 
centralization in practice (Halaburda and Mueller-Bloch 2019). 
 
It is thus important to distinguish between how governance is envisioned and how it is enacted. 
Without this distinction, the potential for decentralization in open-access systems is often 
overstated, while the potential of permissioned systems in achieving decentralization is not fully 
recognized. Open-access systems in principle allow for arbitrary decentralization, but cannot 
guarantee decentralization at any level, as the actual level of decentralization is the result of 
individual decisions. This ambiguity of outcome is important when open access and 
decentralization are desirable or even the reason technologies like blockchain are adopted, for 
instance when there is a goal to promote “democratization,” to avoid intermediaries that are in a 
favorable position to extract economic rents, or when there are no parties that can be trusted with 
regulating permissioned access or making decisions for the majority of users. 
 
The Case of Blockchain 
 
Blockchain technology provides a prominent illustration: While blockchain systems are distributed 
architecturally, control can be centralized and/or access can be permissioned. Permissionless 
blockchains such as Bitcoin’s do not restrict who can validate transactions. Permissioned 
blockchains, however, only grant these rights to selected agents (Beck et al. 2018). With the 
growing interest in permissioned blockchains, it is crucial to understand whether these 
blockchains can actually deliver on the promise of decentralization. 
 
5 
The Bitcoin ideal (Nakamoto 2008) has created the expectation for blockchain technology to 
universally deliver open, decentralized, “democratic” systems that bypass controlling 
intermediaries. Real world applications of blockchain systems, however, show that this ideal is 
the exception rather than the rule (Halaburda 2018). While permissionless blockchains like 
Bitcoin do not restrict who can validate transactions, and thus can allow access close to the 
permissionless ideal, often control is far from decentralized. In the absence of formal checks for 
the underlying centralization forces, centralization emerges in practice, for instance exercised by 
large emergent mining pools with de facto operational power (Arnosti and Weinberg 2018). This 
means that the promise of blockchain to remove trusted third parties remains unfulfilled. For 
example, in May 2018 alone, five open-access blockchains were compromised due to overt 
centralization (Hertig 2018). 
 
Permissioned blockchains have been criticized for not being truly decentralized (e.g., Beedham 
2018), in contrast to open-access blockchains. This is because they restrict who can become a 
validator, which is decided by a gatekeeper giving permissions. In Libra, a cryptocurrency 
spearheaded by Facebook, gatekeeping is the task of the Libra Association, which is governed 
by a council of all existing validator nodes. Therefore, the existing validator nodes jointly serve as 
a gatekeeper and decide whether a new validator is allowed to join the network (Libra 2020). The 
gatekeeper can often also encourage participation through off-blockchain channels. 
 
Designing for Decentralization 
 
While not fully decentralized by design, the governance structure of permissioned systems can 
guarantee a certain level of decentralization. For instance, consensus mechanisms for 
permissioned blockchains can be designed in a way that guarantees a large number of nodes 
get a say in the validation process. Moreover, a large number of validators can be guaranteed 
through off-blockchain negotiation, enforcing their participation. In open-access blockchains 
however, this is impossible to guarantee -- decentralization (or indeed, centralization) can only 
emerge as a potential outcome of free individual decisions.  
 
Not any permissioned blockchain will result in more decentralization than an open-access 
blockchain. For instance, the power to grant and especially to revoke validation rights is central, 
and thus in order to promote decentralization in permissioned blockchains it is necessary to 
decentralize the gatekeeping function. If a central gatekeeper can arbitrarily revoke validation 
rights, it could easily take over and centralize the entire blockchain. While it is possible to 





The case of blockchain technology highlights an important consideration for the governance of 
distributed systems. System designers must account for the interactions between access and 
control, and make design choices based on their goals. As illustrated in the Figure, if the primary 
objective for a distributed system is decentralization, a well-designed permissioned system may 
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Figure: Decentralization in Permissioned and Permissionless Blockchains 
